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Abstract
In this article we consider Stackelberg oligopoly TU-games in γ-characteristic
function form (Chander and Tulkens 1997) in which any deviating coalition
produces an output at a first period as a leader and outsiders simultaneously
and independently play a quantity at a second period as followers. We assume
that the inverse demand function is linear and that firms operate at constant
but possibly distinct marginal costs. Generally speaking, for any TU-game
we show that the 1-concavity property of its dual game is a necessary and
sufficient condition under which the core of the initial game is non-empty and
coincides with the set of imputations. The dual game of a Stackelberg oligopoly
TU-game is of great interest since it describes the marginal contribution of fol-
lowers to join the grand coalition by turning leaders. The aim is to provide
a necessary and sufficient condition which ensures that the dual game of a
Stackelberg oligopoly TU-game satisfies the 1-concavity property. Moreover,
we prove that this condition depends on the heterogeneity of firms’ marginal
costs, i.e., the dual game is 1-concave if and only if firms’ marginal costs are
not too heterogeneous. This last result extends Marini and Currarini’s core
non-emptiness result (2003) for oligopoly situations.
Keywords: Stackelberg oligopoly TU-game; Dual game; 1-concavity
1 Introduction
Usually, oligopoly situations are modeled by means of non-cooperative games. Ev-
ery profit-maximizing firm pursues Nash strategies and the resulting outcome is not
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Pareto optimal. Yet, it is known that firms are better off by forming cartels and that
Pareto efficiency is achieved when all the firms merge together. A problem faced by
the members of a cartel is the stability of the agreement and non-cooperative game
theory predicts that the cartel members always have an incentive to deviate from
the agreed-upon output decision.
However, in some oligopoly situations firms don’t always behave non-cooperatively
and if sufficient communication is feasible it may be possible for firms to sign agree-
ments. A question is then whether it is possible for firms to agree all together and
coordinate their decision to achieve Pareto efficiency. For that, we consider a fully
cooperative approach for oligopoly situations. Under this approach, firms are al-
lowed to sign binding agreements in order to form cartels called coalitions. Under
such an assumption cooperative games called oligopoly TU(Transferable Utility)-
games can be defined and the existence of stable collusive behaviors is then related
to the non-emptiness of the core of such games. Aumann (1959) proposes two ap-
proaches in order to define cooperative games: according to the first, every cartel
computes the total profit which it can guarantee itself regardless of what outsiders
do; the second approach consists in computing the minimal profit for which outsiders
can prevent the cartel members from getting more. These two assumptions lead to
consider the α and β-characteristic functions respectively. However, these two ap-
proaches can be questioned since outsiders probably cause substantial damages upon
themselves by minimizing the profit of the cartel. This is why Chander and Tulkens
(1997) propose an alternative blocking rule where external firms choose their strat-
egy individually as a best reply to the cartel action. This leads to consider the
“partial agreement characteristic function” or, for short, the γ-characteristic func-
tion.
As regards Cournot oligopoly TU-games in α and β-characteristic function forms
with or without transferable technologies,1 Zhao (1999a,b) shows that the α and β-
characteristic functions lead to the same set of Cournot oligopoly TU-games. When
technologies are transferable, Zhao (1999a) provides a necessary and sufficient con-
dition to establish the convexity property in case the inverse demand function and
cost functions are linear. Although these games may fail to be convex in general,
Norde et al. (2002) show they are nevertheless totally balanced. When technologies
are not transferable, Zhao (1999b) proves that the core of such games is non-empty
if every individual profit function is continuous and concave.2 Furthermore, Norde
et al. (2002) show that these games are convex in case the inverse demand function
and cost functions are linear, and Driessen and Meinhardt (2005) provide economi-
cally meaningful sufficient conditions to guarantee the convexity property in a more
general case.
1We refer to Norde et al. (2002) for a detailed discussion of this distinction.
2Zhao shows that the core is non-empty for general TU-games in β-characteristic function form
in which every strategy set is compact and convex, every utility function is continuous and concave,
and satisfying the strong separability condition that requires that the utility function of a coalition
and each of its members’ utility functions have the same minimizers. Zhao proves that Cournot
oligopoly TU-games satisfy this latter condition.
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As regards Cournot oligopoly TU-games in γ-characteristic function form without
transferable technologies, Lardon (2009) shows that the differentiability of the in-
verse demand function ensures that these games are well-defined and provides two
core non-emptiness results. The first result establishes that such games are bal-
anced, and therefore have a non-empty core, if every individual profit function is
continuous and concave. When cost functions are linear, the second result pro-
vides a single-valued allocation rule in the core, called NP(Nash Pro rata)-value,
which is characterized by four axioms: efficiency, null firm, monotonicity and non-
cooperative fairness.3 In a more general framework, Lardon (2010) shows that if the
inverse demand function is continuous but not necessarily differentiable, it is always
possible to define a Cournot oligopoly interval game4 in γ-characteristic function
form. This set of Cournot oligopoly interval games includes the set of Cournot
oligopoly TU-games in γ-characteristic function form. Lardon considers two exten-
sions of the core, the interval core and the standard core, and provides a necessary
and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of each of these two core solution
concepts.
For general TU-games, Marini and Currarini (2003) associate a two-stage structure
with the γ-characteristic function. In this temporal sequence every deviating coali-
tion possesses a first-mover advantage by acting as a leader while outsiders play
their individual best reply strategies as followers. Under standard assumptions on
the payoff functions,5 they prove that if the players and externalities are symmetric6
and the game has strategic complementarities then the equal division solution be-
longs to the core. They also study a quantity competition setting where strategies
are substitutes for which they show that the same mechanism underlying their core
result determines the non-emptiness of the core.
Marini and Currarini’s core non-emptiness result (2003) raises two questions.
The first concerns the core structure of TU-games in sequential form since they
only provide a single-valued allocation rule (the equal division solution) in the core.
The second turns on the role of the symmetric players assumption on the non-
emptiness of the core. In this article we answer both questions by considering
the two-stage structure associated with the γ-characteristic function as suggested
by Marini and Currarini (2003) for oligopoly situations. The introduction of this
temporal sequence leads to consider a specific set of cooperative oligopoly games,
i.e., the set of Stackelberg oligopoly TU-games in γ-characteristic function form.
Thus, contrary to Cournot oligopoly TU-games in γ-characteristic function form in
which all the firms simultaneously choose their strategies, every deviating coalition
produces an output at a first period as a leader and outsiders simultaneously and
independently play a quantity at a second period as followers. We assume that the
3We refer to Lardon (2009) for a precise description of these axioms.
4Interval games are introduced by Branzei et al. (2003).
5Every player’s payoff function is assumed twice differentiable and strictly concave on its own
strategy set.
6The players are symmetric if they have identical payoff functions and strategy sets. External-
ities are symmetric if they are either positive or negative.
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inverse demand function is linear and firms operate at constant but possibly distinct
marginal costs. Thus, contrary to Marini and Currarini (2003) the payoff (profit)
functions are not necessarily identical. The 1-concavity property of the dual game of
a Stackelberg oligopoly TU-game answers the above two questions raised by Marini
and Currarini’s core non-emptiness result (2003). Indeed, generally speaking, for
any TU-game we show that the 1-concavity property of its dual game is a neces-
sary and sufficient condition under which the core of the initial game is non-empty
and coincides with the set of imputations. Particularly, the nucleolus of such a 1-
concave dual game agrees with the center of gravity of the set of imputations. The
dual game of a Stackelberg oligopoly TU-game is of great interest since it gives the
marginal contribution of followers to join the grand coalition by turning leaders. In
order to establish the 1-concavity of the dual game we first characterize the core by
proving that it is equal to the set of imputations which answers the first question.
The reason is that the first-mover advantage gives too much power to singletons
so that the worth of every deviating coalition is less than or equal to the sum of
its members’ individual worths except for the grand coalition. Then, we provide
a necessary and sufficient condition under which the core is non-empty. Finally,
we prove that this condition depends on the heterogeneity of firms’ marginal costs,
i.e., for a fixed number of firms the dual game is 1-concave if and only if firms’
marginal costs are not too heterogeneous. The more the number of firms, the less
the heterogeneity of firms’ marginal costs must be in order to ensure the 1-concavity
of the dual game, and so the non-emptiness of the core, which answers the second
question. Surprisingly, in case the inverse demand function is strictly concave, we
provide an example in which the opposite result holds, i.e., when the heterogeneity
of firms’ marginal costs increases the core becomes larger.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In section 2 we recall some
basic definitions in cooperative game theory and show that Stackelberg oligopoly
TU-games in γ-characteristic function form are well-defined. The aim of Section 3
is to establish the 1-concavity of the dual game. Section 4 gives some concluding
remarks.
2 The model
Before introducing Stackelberg oligopoly TU-games in γ-characteristic function form
(Chander and Tulkens 1997), we recall some basic definitions in cooperative game
theory. Given a set of players N , we call a subset S ∈ 2N\{∅}, a coalition. The
size s = |S| of coalition S is the number of players in S. A TU-game (N, v) is
a set function v : 2N −→ R with the convention that v(∅) = 0, which assigns a
number v(S) ∈ R to every coalition S ∈ 2N\{∅}. The number v(S) is the worth
of coalition S and represents the maximal amount of monetary benefits due to the
mutual cooperation among the members of the coalition, on the understanding that
there are no benefits by absence of players. We denote by G the set of TU-games
where (N, v) is a representative element of G.
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With every TU-game (N, v) ∈ G there is associated its dual game (N, v∗) defined
by v∗(S) = v(N)−v(N\S) for all S ∈ 2N . That is, the worth of any coalition in the
dual game is given by the coalitionally marginal contribution with respect to the
formation of the grand coalition N in the original game. Particularly, v∗(∅) = 0,
v∗(N) = v(N), and so, the marginal contribution mv∗i = v
∗(N) − v∗(N\{i}) =
v({i}) for all i ∈ N .
In the framework of the division problem of the benefits v(N) of the grand coalition
N among the potential players, any allocation scheme of the form x = (xi)i∈N ∈ Rn
is supposed to meet, besides the efficiency principle
∑
i∈N xi = v(N), the so-called
individual rationality condition in that each player is allocated at least the individual
worth, i.e., xi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N . For any TU-game (N, v) ∈ G, these two
conditions lead to consider the set of imputations:
I(N, v) =
{
x ∈ Rn :
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N) and ∀i ∈ N , xi ≥ v({i})
}
.
The best known set-valued solution concept called core requires the group rationality
condition in that the aggregate allocation to the members of any coalition is at least
its coalitional worth:
C(N, v) =
{
x ∈ I(N, v) : ∀S ∈ 2N\{∅, N},
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S)
}
(1)
Of significant importance, is the upper core bound composed of the marginal con-
tributions mvi = v(N) − v(N\{i}), i ∈ N , with respect to the formation of the
grand coalition N in the game (N, v). Obviously, xi ≤ mvi for all i ∈ N and all
x ∈ C(N, v). In this context, we focus on the following core catcher called Core-
Cover:
CC(N, v) =
{
x ∈ Rn :
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N) and ∀i ∈ N , xi ≤ mvi
}
.
Now, we introduce the Stackelberg oligopoly model. A Stackelberg oligopoly
situation is a quintuplet (L,F, (qi, Ci)i∈N , p) defined as:
1. the disjoint finite sets of leaders and followers L and F respectively where
L ∪ F = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of firms denoted by N ;
2. for every i ∈ N , a capacity constraint qi ∈ R+;
3. for every i ∈ N , an individual cost function Ci : R+ −→ R+;
4. an inverse demand function p : R+ −→ R which assigns to any aggregate
quantity X ∈ R+ the unit price p(X).
Throughout this article, we assume that:
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(a) firms have no capacity constraint:
∀i ∈ N , qi = +∞;
(b) firms operate at constant but possibly distinct marginal costs:
∀i ∈ N ,∃ci ∈ R+ : Ci(yi) = ciyi,
where ci is firm i’s marginal cost, and yi ∈ R+ is the quantity produced by
firm i;
(c) firms face the linear inverse demand function:
p(X) = a−X,
where X ∈ R+ is the total production of the industry and a ∈ R+ is the
prohibitive price (the intercept) of the inverse demand function p such that
a ≥ 2n×max{ci : i ∈ N}.
Given assumptions (a), (b) and (c), a Stackelberg oligopoly situation is summarized
by the 4-tuple (L,F, (ci)i∈N , a). Without loss of generality we assume that the firms
are ranked according to their marginal costs, i.e., c1 ≤ . . . ≤ cn. For notational con-
venience, for any set of firms S ∈ 2N\{∅} we denote the minimal coalitional cost
by cS = min{ci : i ∈ S} and by iS ∈ S the firm in S with the smallest index that
operates at marginal cost cS .
The strategic Stackelberg oligopoly game associated with the Stackelberg
oligopoly situation (L,F, (ci)i∈N , a) is a quadruplet Γso = (L,F, (Xi, pii)i∈N ) de-
fined as:
1. the disjoint finite sets of leaders and followers L and F respectively where
N = L ∪ F is the set of firms;
2. for every k ∈ N , an individual strategy set Xk such that:
- for every leader i ∈ L, Xi = R+ where xi ∈ Xi represents the quantity
produced by leader i. We denote by XL =
∏
i∈LXi the set of strategy
profiles of the leaders where xL = (xi)i∈L is a representative element of
XL;
- for every follower j ∈ F , Xj is the set of mappings xj : XL −→ R+
where xj(xL) represents the quantity produced by follower j given lead-
ers’ strategy profile xL ∈ XL. We denote by XF =
∏
j∈F Xj the set of
strategy profiles of the followers where xF = (xj)j∈F is a representative
element of XF ;
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3. for every k ∈ N , an individual profit function pik : XL ×XF −→ R+ such
that:
- for every i ∈ L, pii : XL ×XF −→ R+ is defined as:
pii(xL, xF (xL)) = p(X)xi − cixi;
- for every j ∈ F , pij : XL ×XF −→ R+ is defined as:
pij(xL, xF (xL)) = p(X)xj(xL)− cjxj(xL),
where X =
∑
i∈L xi +
∑
j∈F xj(xL) is the total production.
Given a strategic Stackelberg oligopoly game Γso = (L,F, (Xi, pii)i∈N ), every leader
i ∈ L simultaneously and independently produces an output xi ∈ Xi at a first pe-
riod while every follower j ∈ F simultaneously and independently plays a quantity
xj(xL) ∈ Xj at a second period given leaders’ strategy profile xL ∈ XL. We denote
by Gso the set of strategic Stackelberg oligopoly games.
In case there is a single leader and multiple followers, Sherali et al. (1983)
prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in strategic Stackelberg
oligopoly games under standard assumptions on the inverse demand function and
the individual cost functions, i.e., the inverse demand function is twice differentiable,
strictly decreasing and satisfies:
∀X ∈ R+, dp
dX
(X) +X
d2p
dX2
(X) ≤ 0,
and the individual cost functions are twice differentiable and convex. In particular,
they show that the convexity of followers’ reaction functions with respect to leader’s
output is crucial for the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Assumptions (a), (b)
and (c) ensure that Sherali et al.’s result (1983) holds on Gso so that any strategic
Stackelberg oligopoly game Γso = (L,F, (Xi, pii)i∈N ) ∈ Gso such that |L| = 1 admits
a unique Nash equilibrium.
Now, given a strategic Stackelberg oligopoly game Γso = (L,F, (Xi, pii)i∈N ) ∈
Gso, we want to associate a Stackelberg oligopoly TU-game in γ-characteristic func-
tion form. In a dynamic oligopoly “à la Stackelberg,” this assumption implies that
the coalition members produce an output at a first period, thus anticipating out-
siders’ reaction who simultaneously and independently play a quantity at a second
period. For any coalition S ∈ 2N\{∅} where S = L and N\S = F , the coalition
profit function piS : XS ×XN\S −→ R is defined as:
piS(xS , xN\S(xS)) =
∑
i∈S
pii(xS , xN\S(xS)).
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Moreover, followers’ individual best reply strategies x˜N\S : XS −→ XN\S is
defined as:
∀j ∈ N\S, ∀xS ∈ XS , x˜j(xS) ∈ arg max
xj(xS)∈Xj
pij(xS , x˜N\(S∪{j})(xS), xj(xS)).
For any coalition S ∈ 2N\{∅}, given the strategic Stackelberg oligopoly game
Γso = (S,N\S, (Xi, pii)i∈N ) ∈ Gso, a strategy profile (x∗S , x˜N\S(x∗S)) ∈ XS ×XN\S
is a partial agreement equilibrium under S if:
∀xS ∈ XS , piS(x∗S , x˜N\S(x∗S)) ≥ piS(xS , x˜N\S(xS)),
and
∀j ∈ N\S, ∀xj ∈ Xj , pij(x∗S , x˜N\S(x∗S)) ≥ pij(x∗S , x˜N\(S∪{j})(x∗S), xj(x∗S)).
For any coalition S ∈ 2N\{∅} and the induced strategic Stackelberg oligopoly game
Γso = (S,N\S, (Xi, pii)i∈N ) ∈ Gso, the associated Stackelberg oligopoly TU-
game in γ-characteristic function form, denoted by (N, vγ), is defined as:
vγ(S) = piS(x
∗
S , x˜N\S(x
∗
S)),
where (x∗S , x˜N\S(x
∗
S)) ∈ XS × XN\S is a partial agreement equilibrium under S.
We denote by Gγso ⊆ G the set of Stackelberg oligopoly TU-games in γ-
characteristic function form.
Given a strategic Stackelberg oligopoly game Γso = (S,N\S, (Xi, pii)i∈N ) ∈
Gso, by assumptions (a), (b) and (c), and by the definition of the partial agree-
ment equilibrium, any deviating coalition S ∈ 2N\{∅} can be represented by firm
iS ∈ S (the firm in S with the smallest marginal cost) acting as a single leader
while the other firms in coalition S play a zero output. It follows from Sher-
ali et al.’s result (1983) that the induced strategic Stackelberg oligopoly game
Γso = ({iS}, N\S, (Xi, pii)i∈{iS}∪N\S) ∈ Gso has a unique Nash equilibrium, and
so the strategic Stackelberg oligopoly game Γso admits a partial agreement equi-
librium under S. Indeed, in case there are at least two firms operating at the
minimal marginal cost cS , the most efficient firms in coalition S can coordinate
their output decision and reallocate the Nash equilibrium output of firm iS among
themselves. We conclude that there can exist several partial agreement equilibria
under S which support the unique worth vγ(S). Hence, the γ-characteristic function
is well-defined. The following proposition goes further by expressing the worth of
any deviating coalition.
Proposition 2.1 For any coalition S ∈ 2N\{∅} and the associated strategic Stack-
elberg oligopoly game Γso = (S,N\S, (Xi, pii)i∈N ) ∈ Gso, it holds that:
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vγ(S) =
1
4(n− s+ 1)
(
a+
∑
j∈N\S
cj − cS(n− s+ 1)
)2
.
Proof: Take any coalition S ∈ 2N\{∅} and consider the associated strategic Stack-
elberg oligopoly game Γso = (S,N\S, (Xi, pii)i∈N ) ∈ Gso. In order to compute the
worth vγ(S) of coalition S, we have to successively solve the maximization problems
derived from the definition of the partial agreement equilibrium. First, consider the
profit maximization program of any follower j ∈ N\S at the second period:
∀xS ∈ XS ,∀xN\(S∪{j})(xS) ∈ XN\(S∪{j}), max
xj(xS)∈Xj
pij(xS , xN\(S∪{j})(xS), xj(xS)).
The first-order conditions for a maximum are:
∀j ∈ N\S,∀xN\{j} ∈ XN\{j},
∂pij
∂xj
(xj , xN\{j}) = 0,
and imply that the unique maximizers x˜j(xS), j ∈ N\S, satisfy:
∀j ∈ N\S,∀xS ∈ XS , x˜j(xS) = 1
2
(
a−
∑
i∈S
xi −
∑
k∈N\(S∪{j})
x˜k(xS)− cj
)
.
By solving the above system of equations, we deduce that followers’ individual best
reply strategies at the second period are given by:
∀j ∈ N\S,∀xS ∈ XS , x˜j(xS) = 1
(n− s+ 1)
(
a−
∑
i∈S
xi +
∑
k∈N\S
ck
)
− cj (2)
Then, given x˜N\S(xS) ∈ XN\S consider the profit maximization program of coalition
S at the first period:
max
xS∈XS
piS(xS , x˜N\S(xS)).
Since the firms have no capacity constraint, it follows that the above profit maxi-
mization program of coalition S is equivalent to the profit maximization program
of firm iS ∈ S given that the other members in S play a zero output:
max
xiS∈XiS
piiS (xiS , 0S\{iS}, x˜N\S(xiS , 0S\{iS})).
The first-order condition for a maximum is:
∂piiS
∂xiS
(xiS , 0S\{iS}, x˜N\S(xiS , 0S\{iS})) = 0,
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and implies that the unique maximizer x∗iS ∈ XiS is given by:
x∗iS =
1
2
(
a+
∑
j∈N\S
cj − cS(n− s+ 1)
)
(3)
By (2) and (3), for any j ∈ N\S it holds that:
x˜j(x
∗
S) = x˜j(x
∗
iS
, 0S\{iS})
=
1
2(n− s+ 1)
(
a+
∑
k∈N\S
ck + cS(n− s+ 1)
)
− cj (4)
By (3) and (4), we deduce that:
vγ(S) = piS(x
∗
S , x˜N\S(x
∗
S))
= piiS ((x
∗
iS
, 0S\{iS}), x˜N\S(x
∗
iS
, 0S\{iS}))
=
1
4(n− s+ 1)
(
a+
∑
j∈N\S
cj − cS(n− s+ 1)
)2
,
which completes the proof. 
Thus, the worth of any deviating coalition is increasing with respect to outsiders’
marginal costs and decreasing with respect to the smallest marginal cost among
its members. Note that the condition a ≥ 2n × max{ci : i ∈ N} (assumption (c))
ensures that the equilibrium outputs in (3) and (4) are positive.
3 Characterization of the core and 1-concavity property
In this section, we first introduce the gap function and the 1-concavity property.
Generally speaking, we show that the 1-concavity property of the dual game is a
necessary and sufficient condition for the core of the initial TU-game to coincide
with the set of imputations and to be non-empty. The dual game of a Stackelberg
oligopoly TU-game is of great interest since it gives the marginal contribution of
followers to join the grand coalition by turning leaders. Based on the description of
the γ-characteristic function in a Stackelberg oligopoly TU-game, the aim is to es-
tablish the 1-concavity property of its dual game. To this end, we first characterize
the core by proving that it always coincides with the set of imputations. Then, we
provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which the core is non-empty, and
so the dual game is 1-concave. Finally, we prove that this condition depends on the
heterogeneity of firms’ marginal costs, i.e., the dual game is 1-concave if and only
if firms’ marginal costs are not too heterogeneous. This last result extends Marini
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and Currarini’s core non-emptiness result (2003) for oligopoly situations.
In the setting of the core, a helpful tool appears to be the so-called gap function
gv : 2N −→ R defined by gv(S) = ∑i∈Smvi − v(S) for all S ∈ 2N\{∅} with
mvi = v(N) − v(N\{i}), where gv(∅) = 0. So, the gap gv(S) of any coalition S
measures how much the coalitional worth v(S) differs from the aggregate allocation
based on the individually marginal contributions. The interrelationship between
the gap function and the general inclusion C(N, v) ⊆ CC(N, v) is the following
equivalence:
C(N, v) = CC(N, v)⇐⇒ 0 ≤ gv(N) ≤ gw(S) for all S ∈ 2N\{∅} (5)
In words, the core catcher CC(N, v) coincides with the core C(N, v) if and only if
the non-negative gap function gv attains its minimum at the grand coalition N . If
the latter property (5) holds, the savings game (N, v) ∈ G is said to be 1-convex.
We arrive at the first corollary.
Corollary 3.1 Three equivalent statements for any TU-game (N, v) ∈ G are the
following:
(i) I(N, v) 6= ∅;
(ii) v(N) ≥∑i∈N v({i});
(iii) gv∗(N) ≤ 0.
In fact, the dual game (N, v∗) ∈ G of any TU-game (N, v) ∈ G is treated as a cost
game such that the core equality C(N, v∗) = C(N, v) holds, on the understanding
that the core of any cost game is defined through the reversed inequalities of (1).
Thus, x ∈ C(N, v∗) if and only if x ∈ C(N, v). As the counterpart to 1-convex
TU-games (with non-negative gap functions), we deal with so-called 1-concave TU-
games (with non-positive gap functions). A TU-game (N, v) ∈ G is said to be 1-
concave if its non-positive gap function attains its maximum at the grand coalition
N :
gv(S) ≤ gv(N) ≤ 0 for all S ∈ 2N\{∅} (6)
Corollary 3.2 Three equivalent statements for any TU-game (N, v) ∈ G are the
following:
(i) The dual game (N, v∗) is 1-concave, that is (6) applied to (N, v∗) holds;
(ii) It holds that:
v(N) ≥
∑
i∈N
v({i}) and v(S) ≤
∑
i∈S
v({i}) for all S ∈ 2N\{∅, N} (7)
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(iii) I(N, v) 6= ∅ and C(N, v) = I(N, v).
Proof: In view of Corollary 3.1, together with C(N, v) ⊆ I(N, v), it remains to
prove the implication (iii) =⇒ (ii). By contraposition, suppose (ii) does not hold in
that there exists S ∈ 2N\{∅, N} with v(S) >∑i∈S v({i}). Define the allocation x ∈
Rn by xi = v({i}) for all i ∈ S and xi = v({i}) + (1/(n− s))
(
v(N)−∑j∈N v({j}))
for all i ∈ N\S. Obviously, x ∈ I(N, v)\C(N, v). 
Now, we want to provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which the dual
game of a Stackelberg oligopoly TU-game in γ-characteristic function form is 1-
concave. In order to establish the 1-concavity of the dual game (N, v∗γ) ∈ G, we
want to show (iii) of Corollary 3.2. First, the following proposition provides a
characterization of the core.
Proposition 3.3 Let (N, vγ) ∈ Gγso be a Stackelberg oligopoly TU-game. Then, it
holds that:
C(N, vγ) = I(N, vγ).
In order to establish the proof of Proposition 3.3 we first need the following lemma.
Given a set of marginal costs {ci}i∈N and any coalition S ∈ 2N\{∅} let α(S) =∑
j∈S\{iS}(cS − cj)2 and denote by:
A1(S) =
1
2
∑
j∈S\{iS}
∑
k∈S\{iS}
(cj − ck)2; B1(S) = (s− 1)
(
α(S)−A1(S)
)
;
C1(S) = −(s− 1)
(
sα(S) +A1(S)
)
; D1(S) = −(s− 1)
(
α(S) +A1(S)
)
.
We define the functions f1 : N× 2N\{∅} −→ R and f2 : N× 2N\{∅} −→ R as:
f1(n, S) = 3A1(S)n
2 +
(
3A1(S) + 2B1(S)
)
n+A1(S) +B1(S) + C1(S);
f2(n, S) = A1(S)n
3 +B1(S)n
2 + C1(S)n+D1(S).
Lemma 3.4 Let {ci}i∈N be a set of marginal costs. Then, for any n ≥ 3 and any
coalition S ∈ 2N\{∅} such that s ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1} it holds that (i) f1(n, S) ≥ 0, and
(ii) f2(n, S) ≥ 0.
Proof: First we show point (i). For any n ≥ 3 and any coalition S ∈ 2N\{∅} such
that s = n− 1 it holds that:
f1(n, S) = (n
2 − 4)α(S) + (n2 + 5n+ 5)A1(S)
≥ 0 (8)
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Then, we show that for any n ≥ 3 and any coalition S ∈ 2N\{∅} such that s ∈
{2, . . . , n− 1}, f1(n, S) ≥ 0. We proceed by a double induction on the number of
firms n ≥ 3 and the size s ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1} of coalition S respectively.
Initialisation: assume that n = 3 and take any coalition S ∈ 2N\{∅} such that
s = 2. By (8) it holds that f1(3, S) ≥ 0.
Induction hypothesis: assume that for any n ≤ k and for any coalition S ∈
2N\{∅} such that s ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1}, f1(n, S) ≥ 0.
Induction step: we want to show that for n = k + 1 and for any coalition S ∈
2N\{∅} such that s ∈ {2, . . . , k}, f1(k + 1, S) ≥ 0. It follows from (8) that for any
coalition S ∈ 2N\{∅} such that s = k, f1(k + 1, S) ≥ 0. It remains to show that
for any coalition S ∈ 2N\{∅} such that s ∈ {2, . . . , k − 1}, f1(k + 1, S) ≥ 0. Take
any coalition S ∈ 2N\{∅} such that s ∈ {2, . . . , k − 1}. Then it follows from the
definition of f1 and the induction hypothesis that:
f1(k + 1, S) = f1(k, S) + 6A1(S)k + 6A1(S) + 2B1(S)
= f1(k, S) +A1(S)(6k − 2s+ 8) + 2(s− 1)α(S)
≥ 0,
which concludes the proof of point (i).
Then, we show point (ii). For any n ≥ 3 and any coalition S ∈ 2N\{∅} such that
s = n− 1 it holds that:
f2(n, S) = (n
2 − 3n+ 2)α(S) + (n2 + n+ 2)A1(S)
≥ 0 (9)
Then, we show that for any n ≥ 3 and any coalition S ∈ 2N\{∅} such that s ∈
{2, . . . , n− 1}, f2(n, S) ≥ 0. We proceed by a double induction on the number of
firms n ≥ 3 and the size s ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1} of coalition S respectively.
Initialisation: assume that n = 3 and take any coalition S ∈ 2N\{∅} such that
s = 2. By (9) it holds that f2(3, S) ≥ 0.
Induction hypothesis: assume that for any n ≤ k and for any coalition S ∈
2N\{∅} such that s ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1}, f2(n, S) ≥ 0.
Induction step: we want to show that for n = k + 1 and for any coalition S ∈
2N\{∅} such that s ∈ {2, . . . , k}, f2(k + 1, S) ≥ 0. It follows from (9) that for any
coalition S ∈ 2N\{∅} such that s = k, f2(k + 1, S) ≥ 0. It remains to show that
for any coalition S ∈ 2N\{∅} such that s ∈ {2, . . . , k − 1}, f2(k + 1, S) ≥ 0. Take
any coalition S ∈ 2N\{∅} such that s ∈ {2, . . . , k − 1}. Then it follows from the
definitions of f1 and f2, the induction hypothesis and point (i) of Lemma 3.4 that:
f2(k + 1, S) = f2(k, S) + f1(k, S)
≥ 0,
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which concludes the proof of point (ii). 
Now, we are ready to establish the proof of Proposition 3.3 which consists in showing
that the first-mover advantage gives too much power to singletons so that the worth
of any deviating coalition is less than or equal to the sum of its members’ individual
worths except for the grand coalition. Given a set of marginal costs {ci}i∈N and
any coalition S ∈ 2N\{∅} we denote by:
A2(S) =
(n− s)(s− 1)
4n(n− s+ 1) (note that for s ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1}, A2(S) > 0);
B2(S) =
1
2n
∑
i∈S
( ∑
j∈N\{i}
cj − nci
)
− 1
2(n− s+ 1)
( ∑
j∈N\S
cj − cS(n− s+ 1)
)
;
C2(S) =
1
4n
∑
i∈S
( ∑
j∈N\{i}
cj − nci
)2
− 1
4(n− s+ 1)
( ∑
j∈N\S
cj − cS(n− s+ 1)
)2
.
These quantities will be used in the following proof.
Proof (of Proposition 3.3): First, assume that n = 2. By the definitions of the
core and the set of imputations it holds that C(N, vγ) = I(N, vγ).
Then, assume that n ≥ 3. The core is equal to the set of imputations if and only if:
∀S ∈ 2N\{∅} : s ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1}, vγ(S) ≤
∑
i∈S
vγ({i}).
In order to prove the above condition, take any coalition S ∈ 2N\{∅} such that
s ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1}. By Proposition 2.1 we deduce that:∑
i∈S
vγ({i})− vγ(S) = A2(S)a2 +B2(S)a+ C2(S).
Now, we define the mapping PS : R −→ R as:
PS(y) = A2(S)y
2 +B2(S)y + C2(S),
so that PS(a) =
∑
i∈S vγ({i}) − vγ(S). We want to show that for any y ∈ R,
PS(y) ≥ 0. It follows from A2(S) > 0 that the minimum of PS is obtained at point
y∗ ∈ R such that:
y∗ = − B2(S)
2A2(S)
.
After some calculation steps, we obtain that the minimum of PS is equal to:
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PS(y
∗) =
1
4n(n− s)(s− 1)f2(n, S),
where f2 is defined as in Lemma 3.4. Hence, it follows from point (ii) of Lemma
3.4 that PS(y∗) ≥ 0, which implies that for any y ∈ R, PS(y) ≥ 0. In particular, we
conclude that PS(a) ≥ 0, and so
∑
i∈S vγ({i})− vγ(S) ≥ 0. 
Now, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of
the core of Stackelberg oligopoly TU-games in γ-characteristic function form as
enunciated in the following proposition.
Theorem 3.5 Let (N, vγ) ∈ Gγso be a Stackelberg oligopoly TU-game. Then, its
dual game (N, v∗γ) ∈ G is 1-concave if and only if:
2a
(∑
i∈N
ci − ncN
)
≥
∑
i∈N
( ∑
j∈N\{i}
cj − nci
)2
− nc2N (10)
or equivalently
2a(cN − cN ) ≥
(n+ 1)2
n
∑
j∈N
c2j −
(n+ 2)
n
(∑
j∈N
cj
)2
− c2N (11)
where cN =
∑
i∈N ci/n is the average cost of the grand coalition.
Proof: It follows from Proposition 3.3 that the core is non-empty if and only if∑
i∈N vγ({i}) ≤ vγ(N). By Proposition 2.1 it holds that:
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∑
i∈N
vγ({i}) = 1
4n
∑
i∈N
(
a+
∑
j∈N\{i}
cj − nci
)2
=
1
4n
∑
i∈N
(
a+
∑
j∈N\{i}
cj − nci − cN + cN
)2
=
1
4n
∑
i∈N
[(
a− cN
)2
+ 2(a− cN )
( ∑
j∈N\{i}
cj − nci + cN
)
+
( ∑
j∈N\{i}
cj − nci + cN
)2]
= vγ(N) +
1
4n
[
2a
(
ncN −
∑
i∈N
ci
)
+
∑
i∈N
( ∑
j∈N\{i}
cj − nci
)2
− nc2N
]
= vγ(N) +
1
4n
[
2a
(
ncN − ncN
)
+ (n+ 1)2
∑
j∈N
c2j
− (n+ 2)
(∑
j∈N
cj
)2
− nc2N
]
,
which permits to conclude that
∑
i∈N vγ({i}) ≤ vγ(N) if and only if inequalities
(10) or (11) holds. 
In case all the firms have the same marginal cost, the both sides of inequality (10)
are equal to zero which implies that
∑
i∈N vγ({i}) = vγ(N), and so (vγ({i}))i∈N =
(vγ(N)/n)i∈N is the unique core element which coincides with Marini and Cur-
rarini’s core allocation result (2003).
Driessen et al. (2010) show that the nucleolus of any 1-concave TU-game coincides
with the center of gravity of the core. Hence, for any Stackelberg oligopoly TU-
game (N, vγ) ∈ Gγso, the dual game (N, v∗γ) is 1-concave if and only if inequality
(10) holds, implying that the nucleolus of (N, v∗γ) is the center of gravity of the core
of (N, v∗γ).
The following theorem gives a more relevant expression of inequality (10). When
the difference between any two successive marginal costs is constant, it provides an
upper bound on the heterogeneity of firms’ marginal costs below which inequality
(10) holds.
Theorem 3.6 Let (N, vγ) ∈ Gγso be a Stackelberg oligopoly TU-game such that:
∃δ ∈ R+ : ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, ci+1 = ci + δ (12)
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Then, inequality (10) holds if and only if:
δ ≤ δ∗(n) = 12(a− cN )(n− 1)
n4 + 2n3 + 3n2 − 8n+ 2 (13)
Proof: It follows from (12) that inequality (10) can be expressed as:
∑
i∈N
(
δ
(n2 − 2ni+ n)
2
− ci
)2
− nc2N ≤ an(n− 1)δ.
By noting that:∑
i∈N
c2i − nc2N = δcNn(n− 1) + δ2
n(n− 1)(2n− 1)
6
,
we deduce that the above inequality is equivalent to:
δ
[∑
i∈N
(
n2 − 2ni+ n
2
)2
+
n(n− 1)(2n− 1)
6
]
≤ (a− cN )n(n− 1)
+
∑
i∈N
(n2 − 2ni+ n)ci (14)
It remains to compute the two sums in inequality (14). First, it holds that:
∑
i∈N
(
n2 − 2ni+ n
2
)2
=
n3(n+ 1)2
4
− n2(n+ 1)
∑
i∈N
i+ n2
∑
i∈N
i2
=
1
12
(
2n4(n+ 1)− n3(n+ 1)2) (15)
Then, it holds that:
∑
i∈N
ci = ncN + δ
n−1∑
i=1
i
= n
(
cN + δ
(n− 1)
2
)
,
and
∑
i∈N
ici = cN
n∑
i=1
i+ δ
n∑
i=1
i(i− 1)
= cN
n(n+ 1)
2
+ δ
n(n+ 1)(2n− 2)
6
.
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Hence, we deduce that:
∑
i∈N
(n2 − 2ni+ n)ci = (n2 + n)
∑
i∈N
ci − 2n
∑
i∈N
ici
=
1
6
(
δn2(n+ 1)(1− n)) (16)
By (15) and (16), we conclude that inequality (14) is equivalent to (13). 
By noting that:
dδ∗
dn
(n) = −36(a− cN )(n
2 + 2n+ 2)
(n3 + 3n2 + 6n− 2)2
< 0,
and
d2δ∗
dn2
(n) =
72(a− cN )(2n4 + 8n3 + 15n2 + 20n+ 14)
(n3 + 3n2 + 6n− 2)3
> 0,
we deduce that the bound δ∗(n) is strictly decreasing and strictly convex with re-
spect to the number of firms n. Moreover, when n tends to infinity its limit is
equal to 0. So, the more the number of firms is, the less the heterogeneity of firms’
marginal costs must be in order to ensure the non-emptiness of the core. This result
extends Marini and Currarini’s core allocation result (2003) and shows that their
result crucially depends on the symmetric players assumption.
We saw that when the heterogeneity of firms’ marginal costs increases the core
becomes smaller. Surprisingly, in case the inverse demand function is strictly con-
cave, the following example shows that the opposite result may holds, i.e., when the
heterogeneity of firms’ marginal costs increases the core becomes larger.
Example 3.7
Consider the three Stackelberg oligopoly TU-games (N, v1γ) ∈ Gγso, (N, v2γ) ∈ Gγso
and (N, v3γ) ∈ Gγso associated with the Stackelberg oligopoly situations (L,F, (c1, c12), p),
(L,F, (c1, c
2
2), p) and (L,F, (c1, c32), p) respectively where N = {1, 2}, c1 = c12 = 2,
c22 = 4, c32 = 5 and p = 10−X2. The worths of any coalition S ∈ 2N\{∅} are given
in the following table:
S {1} {2} {1, 2}
v1γ(S) 4.70 4.70 8.71
v2γ(S) 6.19 2.02 8.71
v3γ(S) 7.05 1.05 8.71
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Thus, it holds that ∅ = C(N, v1γ) ⊂ C(N, v2γ) ⊂ C(N, v3γ), and so when the hetero-
geneity of firms’ marginal costs increases the core becomes larger. 
4 Concluding remarks
In this article we have considered Stackelberg oligopoly TU-games in γ-characteristic
function form (Chander and Tulkens 1997) in which every deviating coalition pro-
duces an output at a first period and outsiders simultaneously and independently
play a quantity at a second period. We have assumed that the inverse demand func-
tion is linear and that firms operate at constant but possibly distinct marginal and
average costs. Thus, contrary to Marini and Currarini (2003) the payoff (profit)
functions are not necessarily identical. Generally speaking, for any TU-game we
have showed that the 1-concavity property of its dual game is a necessary and suffi-
cient condition under which the core of the initial TU-game coincides with the set of
imputations and is non-empty. Particularly, the nucleolus of such a 1-concave dual
game agrees with the center of gravity of the set of imputations. The dual game of
a Stackelberg oligopoly TU-game is of great interest since it describes the marginal
contribution of followers to join the grand coalition by turning leaders. Based on
the description of the γ-characteristic function in a Stackelberg oligopoly TU-game,
the aim was to establish the 1-concavity property of its dual game. To this end, we
have first proved that the core always coincides with the set of imputations. Indeed,
the first-mover advantage gives too much power to singletons so that the worth of
every deviating coalition is less than or equal to the sum of its members’ individual
worths except for the grand coalition. Then, we have provided a necessary and suf-
ficient condition under which the core is non-empty. Finally, we have proved that
this condition depends on the heterogeneity of firms’ marginal costs, i.e., the dual
game is 1-concave if and only if firms’ marginal costs are not too heterogeneous.
The more the number of firms, the less the heterogeneity of firms’ marginal costs
must be in order to ensure the 1-concavity property of the dual game. This last
result extends Marini and Currarini’s core non-emptiness result (2003) for oligopoly
situations and shows that their result crucially depends on their symmetric players
assumption. Surprisingly, in case the inverse demand function is strictly concave,
we have provided an example in which the opposite result holds, i.e., when the het-
erogeneity of firms’ marginal costs increases the core becomes larger.
Instead of quantity competition, we can associate a two-stage structure with the
γ-characteristic function in a price competition setting. Marini and Currarini’s core
non-emptiness result (2003) applies to this setting and they provide examples in
which the core of the sequential Bertrand oligopoly TU-games is included in the
core of the classical Bertrand oligopoly TU-games. A question concerns the effect
of the heterogeneity of firms’ marginal costs on the non-emptiness of the core. This
is left for future work.
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